KITE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] The South Wilderness Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA) filed an action against William R. Fix to recover $2,500 in assessments he allegedly owed as a lot owner in the South Wilderness Ranches Subdivision. The HOA also sought interest and attorney fees. Mr. Fix denied that he owed the assessments and filed a counterclaim seeking a judicial determination that the covenants pursuant to which the assessments were to be paid were null and void. In the alternative, he sought damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when the HOA failed to enforce the covenants and allowed his neighbor to build a fence that violated the covenants.
[¶ 3] Mr. Fix appeals, claiming the district court erred in granting summary judgment against him on the HOA's complaint and severing his counterclaim. He also claims the attorney fees and costs award is excessive. We affirm the district court's order and judgment with the exception that we vacate the costs awarded for legal research.
[¶ 4] Mr. Fix, appearing pro se,
The HOA asserts the district court rulings were proper and seeks leave to submit evidence of its fees, costs and expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in defending this appeal.
[¶ 5] Mr. Fix owns Lot 2 in South Wilderness Ranches Subdivision in Teton County, Wyoming. The HOA is responsible for providing common services in the subdivision and for making and collecting annual assessments from the lot owners. On September 22, 2009, the HOA filed a complaint in circuit court alleging that Mr. Fix had failed to pay the 2009 annual assessment of $1,000. The HOA sought payment of the assessment plus interest, costs and attorney fees as provided in the subdivision covenants.
[¶ 6] Mr. Fix answered the complaint, admitting that he owned Lot 2 in the subdivision but denying that he owed the 2009 assessment. He also filed a counterclaim for breach of contract asserting that the HOA breached the covenants by failing to enforce them and seeking a judicial determination that the covenants were null and void.
[¶ 7] Accordingly, on November 15, 2010, the HOA filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint to include collection of the 2010 assessment. The district court granted the motion and the HOA filed its amended complaint on December 30, 2010. Meanwhile, on November 16, 2010, without seeking leave of court, Mr. Fix filed an amended answer, amended counterclaim and third party complaint. In his amended counterclaim and third party complaint, Mr. Fix sought a judgment declaring that the covenants were void and unenforceable or, in the alternative, that the neighbor's fence violated the covenants and he was entitled to damages.
[¶ 8] The HOA filed a motion to strike the new pleadings on the ground that Mr. Fix did not obtain the court's approval before filing them. The court convened a hearing at which time Mr. Fix asked the court to accept his amended pleadings based upon his recollection that the parties were ordered to amend their pleadings without seeking leave of court. The court accepted Mr. Fix's explanation and denied the motion to strike as to the amended answer and counterclaim. However, the court concluded the neighbor was not a proper third party defendant and granted the motion to strike as to the third party complaint.
[¶ 9] The court set the case for trial in May of 2011. In April, the HOA filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the court entered an order granting judgment for the HOA in the amount of $2,500, the total of the two assessments, plus interest, costs and attorney fees. The court also granted judgment for the HOA on Mr. Fix's counterclaim for breach of the covenants. The court vacated the trial date and set for hearing and sought additional briefing on the issue of whether it should sever Mr. Fix's remaining counterclaim for declaratory relief. Upon considering the parties' briefs and arguments on that issue, the court entered an order severing the remaining counterclaim.
[¶ 10] Subsequently, in September of 2011, the district court entered judgment on the complaint in the HOA's favor and against Mr. Fix and awarded the HOA the $2,500 assessments, $787.98 in prejudgment interest, $17,439.00 in attorney fees and $1,350.40 in costs, for a total judgment of $22,077.38. Mr. Fix timely appealed.
[¶ 11] In his first issue, Mr. Fix contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the HOA on its complaint.
Weber v. State, 2011 WY 127, ¶ 10, 261 P.3d 225, 227 (Wyo.2011) (citation omitted).
[¶ 13] In his third issue, Mr. Fix challenges the district court's order severing his counterclaim from the HOA's claims. W.R.C.P. 42(b) provides that a court may order a separate trial of any claim, including a counterclaim "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy." The decision to order separate trials is within the discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is found. Beavis v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 2001 WY 32, ¶ 17, 20 P.3d 508, 514 (Wyo.2001).
[¶ 14] Mr. Fix contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the HOA in the face of his affidavit which he alleges demonstrated the existence of numerous issues of material fact with respect to the affirmative defenses of laches, equitable estoppel, unclean hands, selective enforcement and failure of consideration. In essence, Mr. Fix argues that he was justified in withholding payment of the 2009 and 2010 assessments because the HOA failed to enforce the covenants prohibiting his neighbor from erecting a boundary fence and posting no trespassing signs. He contends his refusal to pay the assessments was warranted because, through its inaction, the HOA interfered with his enjoyment of his home. He asserts the HOA's failure to enforce the covenants constituted a failure of consideration excusing his performance.
[¶ 15] In his brief filed with this Court, Mr. Fix cites no authority to support his arguments that he was justified in not paying the assessments other than a citation to 42 Am. Jur. POF 3d Circumstances Establishing Equitable Defense to Breach of Restrictive Covenant § 463 (1997) for the proposition that "the defendant in an action for breach of a restrictive covenant may, depending on the circumstances, plead certain equitable defenses to enforcement of the covenant at issue." Mr. Fix makes no reference to the elements necessary to prove the affirmative defenses and presents no argument other than the bald assertion that his affidavit established the elements of the affirmative defenses, the district court ignored those defenses and jury questions existed.
[¶ 16] Mr. Fix next contends the district court's attorney fees award is excessive. He asserts the issues before the court were simple and involved very limited written discovery, no depositions and no trial. Despite the simplicity of the case, he points out that the court awarded fees seven times greater than the $2,500 damage award. He maintains the HOA's employment of three attorneys was unreasonable and the hours for which they billed were excessive and unnecessary. He further asserts the district court abused its discretion in making the award without a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the fees claimed, in denying his motion to strike the attorney affidavits and in awarding the fees when the HOA failed to designate an attorney expert.
[¶ 17] Generally, Wyoming subscribes to the American rule regarding recovery of attorney fees, making each party responsible for its own attorney fees unless an award of fees is permitted by contract or statute. Joe's Concrete and Lumber, Inc. v. Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc., 2011 WY 74, ¶ 15, 252 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo.2011). In the present case, the subdivision covenants expressly provided for the recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in enforcing them. The HOA was, therefore, entitled to a reasonable attorney fees award. In awarding fees, the district court was required to consider all attorney fees evidence in the record and determine whether: 1) the fee charged represented the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate; and 2) other factors warranted adjusting the fee upward or downward. Id. at ¶ 19, 252 P.3d at 449.
[¶ 18] In its nearly eleven page discussion of the issue, the district court thoughtfully considered each of the arguments Mr. Fix advances on appeal. It concluded in essence that Mr. Fix turned what would otherwise have been a simple, straightforward case into complicated, drawn-out litigation. Specifically, the court found that the positions Mr. Fix took in his answer, counterclaim and third party complaint, gave the HOA attorneys "no choice but to spend significant time preparing, researching, filing and arguing" their summary judgment motion, which they supported with nine exhibits. The court stated that it "thoroughly reviewed the [HOA's] summary judgment motion, brief and supporting documents in preparing its summary judgment order" and concluded the time spent on the motion as reflected in the itemized schedule of legal services was reasonable and necessary under the circumstances to secure a judgment for the unpaid assessments. Addressing the time the HOA's attorneys spent responding to Mr. Fix's equitable defenses, the court found the issues were "novel and difficult and reasonably required significant time, labor and skill" on the attorneys' part and the time spent successfully refuting Mr. Fix's defenses was reasonable. Likewise, the court concluded the time the attorneys spent researching Mr. Fix's claim that his neighbor was a proper third party defendant was reasonable, as was the time they spent preparing the motion to strike Mr. Fix's amended pleadings. In short, the court concluded the time spent was necessitated largely by Mr. Fix and was reasonable under the circumstances. We find nothing in the record warranting a conclusion that the court could not reasonably have concluded as it did, and we affirm the attorney fees award.
[¶ 19] Mr. Fix next claims the district court erred in severing his counterclaim from the proceedings on the HOA's complaint. He argues that the actions of his neighbor precipitated the litigation; therefore, he properly sought to join the neighbor as a party so that the rights of all parties could be determined in one action. Under the circumstances, he maintains, the court could not reasonably have concluded that severance was appropriate.
[¶ 20] W.R.C.P. 42(b) provides in relevant part:
Addressing the rule, we have said that a court may reasonably separate claims when they are not so interwoven that independent trials would cause confusion and uncertainty and result in the denial of a fair trial. Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297 (Wyo.1992).
[¶ 21] This case began as a simple collection case with the sole issue being whether Mr. Fix was required and had failed to pay a $1,000 lot assessment. That issue was conducive to resolution separate and apart from whether the HOA or Mr. Forelle violated the covenants; it was not so interwoven with the issues Mr. Fix sought to litigate that an independent proceeding to resolve it caused confusion, uncertainty or the denial of a fair trial. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it severed the claims.
[¶ 22] In his final issue, Mr. Fix asserts the district court erred in awarding $1,228.00 in costs for online legal research. He maintains that online legal research is not one of the costs authorized by the rules and awarding them here gave the HOA a double recovery for the same effort because the court also awarded attorney fees for the hours spent doing legal research.
[¶ 23] The rule in Wyoming has been that legal research is a component of attorney fees and cannot be taxed as an item of costs. Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1092 (Wyo.1999). The rationale for the rule is that legal research is a component included in an attorney's hourly rate as overhead; thus, it should not be separately recoverable as a cost. Some courts, however, have awarded costs for computer aided legal research, finding that such research is "reasonable, if not essential, in contemporary legal practice." Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 285 (3d Cir.1980). The parties' arguments and the district court's ruling in this case do not mention Snyder. Absent some contention by the parties that this Court should reconsider Snyder, we decline to do so in this case. We vacate the award of $1,228.00 for legal research.
[¶ 24] The HOA asks this Court to award it attorney fees and costs in defending this appeal pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05:
We are reluctant to grant sanctions and will do so only in rare circumstances. Grynberg v. L & R Exploration Venture, 2011 WY 134, ¶ 30, 261 P.3d 731, 739 (Wyo.2011). Given that we have vacated the award of costs for legal research, we are not willing to certify that there was no reasonable cause for this appeal. We decline the HOA's invitation to award it attorney fees and costs.
[¶ 25] We affirm the district court's order and judgment with the exception that we vacate the costs awarded for legal research.
Subsequently, with the consent of the parties and the circuit court, the district court assigned the case to the circuit court that originally had the case pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-112 (LexisNexis 2011), which provides in pertinent part:
In ruling on the various motions and entering judgment in this case, the circuit court acted on behalf of the district court and district court jurisdiction of the case continued despite assignment to the circuit court. Therefore, we treat those rulings as having come from the district court.
